This background accompanies Israel RealTime’s coalition analysis dated November 2, 2026. Netanyahu’s bloc holds 53 seats in the latest reported allocation, the non-Arab opposition 48 and the Arab parties 19. Several combinations can pass a confidence vote or reach an absolute majority, but their participants have not agreed on leadership, service obligations, security policy or the terms of outside support.
Contents
- Seat allocations and possible combinations
- Minority government and caretaker government
- Eisenkot’s principles and parliamentary agenda
- Bennett and Lapid face different decisions
- Opposition commitments and the 2021 precedent
- Ra’am and the Joint List
- Netanyahu’s options and the question of trust
- Herzog and the new Knesset
- Election investigations and the status of the results
- Trump’s public partnership and possible involvement
- Iran timing and the wider security burden
- Emergency cooperation and lasting unity
- What would change the assessment
Seat allocations and possible combinations
The latest complete allocation carried in Israel RealTime’s October 29 reporting is:
| Party or list | Seats |
|---|---|
| Likud | 27 |
| Yashar | 21 |
| Together | 12 |
| Joint List | 11 |
| Democrats | 8 |
| Ra’am | 8 |
| Yisrael Beiteinu | 7 |
| United Torah Judaism | 7 |
| Otzma Yehudit | 7 |
| Shas | 6 |
| Religious Zionism–Zehut | 6 |
| Total | 120 |
Likud gained a seat from Shas without changing the Netanyahu bloc’s combined 53. Ra’am’s gain from the Joint List likewise left the Arab parties’ total at 19. Earlier reports differed over completion of double-envelope counting; the later complete allocation, rather than the earlier 26-seat Likud or seven-seat Ra’am projection, is the basis used here. Formal presentation of results is scheduled for November 4.
| Combination | Seats |
|---|---|
| Netanyahu bloc | 53 |
| Netanyahu bloc plus Yashar | 74 |
| Netanyahu bloc plus all of Together | 65 |
| Netanyahu bloc plus Bennett’s seven representatives | 60 |
| Netanyahu bloc plus Yisrael Beiteinu | 60 |
| Netanyahu bloc plus Ra’am | 61 |
| Non-Arab opposition plus Ra’am | 56 |
| Non-Arab opposition plus both Arab parties | 67 |
| Non-Arab opposition plus both Arab parties, without Yisrael Beiteinu | 60 |
| Non-Arab opposition plus Shas and United Torah Judaism | 61 |
| That Haredi combination without Yisrael Beiteinu | 54 |
| Non-Arab opposition plus Likud | 75 |
| Likud, Yashar, Together and Yisrael Beiteinu | 67 |
| Netanyahu bloc plus Yashar, excluding Otzma Yehudit | 67 |
| Netanyahu bloc plus Yashar, excluding Otzma Yehudit and Religious Zionism–Zehut | 61 |
| Netanyahu bloc plus Yashar, excluding Shas and United Torah Judaism | 61 |
These are calculations from reported seats. They assume all named participants agree and remain. Bennett’s seven representatives are Segal’s description of political affiliations within Together, not an announced separate faction.
Israel RealTime count and allocation report
Minority government and caretaker government
A minority government has governing parties holding fewer than 61 seats. Outside parties can support its formation or abstain without joining the coalition or taking ministries. Initial confidence requires more votes for than against. The 2021 Bennett–Lapid government was approved 60–59 with one abstention.
The opposition and Ra’am could win 56–53 if the Joint List abstained. If both Arab parties merely abstained, the opposition’s 48 would lose to Netanyahu’s 53. Netanyahu could win 53–48 if both Arab parties abstained, but would lose if all 19 opposed him.
A minority arrangement can have a negotiated support agreement or seek votes issue by issue. Its stability depends partly on reliable support for budgets and other necessary legislation. Fewer than 61 coalition seats do not automatically make government formation illegal or continued government impossible.
Continuing as caretaker prime minister is different: Netanyahu remains in office until a successor government is formed. Another candidate receiving the mandate does not itself remove him.
Israel Democracy Institute explanation
Eisenkot’s principles and parliamentary agenda
Eisenkot’s October 31 statement sets four foundations: Israel as Jewish, democratic, liberal and egalitarian; commitment to the Declaration of Independence; mandatory military, national or civilian service for every citizen; and recognition of Hamas as a terrorist organization whose military and governing power in Gaza must be destroyed.
Any MK accepting these principles could become a partner. His priorities include a state commission of inquiry, universal service, strengthening IDF personnel, rewarding those who serve and repealing judicial-overhaul laws. Each proposal requires its own parliamentary support.
Segal noted that the statement omitted an explicit rejection of Netanyahu. Its significance remains unresolved. Eisenkot had previously categorically rejected serving under Netanyahu, including through rotation, and said he would resign if he broke that commitment.
Joint List number four Bakr Awawda said:
“If Eisenkot wants to form a government, he must back down from the four principles he presented during his election campaign.”
That is Awawda’s statement, not an established final condition accepted by every Joint List representative. It exposes a substantive disagreement over the proposed partnership.
Eisenkot has also said that, before a new government is sworn in, he would support operations only against direct and immediate threats that cannot wait. That is a condition on his political support, rather than a legal veto.
Eisenkot’s government plan · Awawda’s statement and Herzog’s appeal
Bennett and Lapid face different decisions
Bennett has recommended Eisenkot to form a government. The recommendation does not establish his agreement to every coalition that could install Eisenkot.
Segal assesses that Eisenkot would not want to join Netanyahu without Bennett and could not carry an arrangement involving Haredi and/or Arab parties without him. Netanyahu and Eisenkot already total 74, so Bennett’s importance in this argument is political, rather than a mathematical requirement.
Segal describes Together’s 12 seats as seven Bennett representatives and five Lapid representatives, and doubts all 12 would enter a Netanyahu government together. Lapid has avoided serving under Netanyahu for more than a decade, including during wartime and the pandemic.
In Segal’s assessment, Eisenkot could obtain the premiership in a minority government or a central position in unity. Bennett could instead reverse campaign commitments for a senior ministry, with risks among military-service voters and right-wing voters. Another election could offer Bennett a chance to improve his position. These remain Segal’s assessments of incentives, rather than Bennett’s declared plan.
Segal’s coalition assessment and Bennett’s recommendation · Together’s reported composition
Opposition commitments and the 2021 precedent
The opposition spans right, center and left. Golan has consistently advocated Jewish-Arab partnership, entered parliamentary politics in 2019 and later served as deputy economy minister. His meetings with Abbas, Lapid and Eisenkot pursue that policy. His willingness does not commit the other leaders.
Bennett has again rejected reliance on Arab parties. Liberman’s campaign restrictions rejected Netanyahu, Shas and United Torah Judaism, and an Arab-dependent minority government, including a temporary arrangement. Segal subsequently argued that Liberman’s refusal to sit with Netanyahu or Tibi left questions over Ra’am and outside support. Several Yashar lawmakers reportedly oppose dependence even on Arab-party abstentions.
Before the 2021 election, Bennett pledged against a government based on Abbas’s votes and against making Lapid prime minister, including through rotation. He then formed a government with Lapid and Ra’am. Lapid helped construct the partnership, and Liberman served as finance minister. Past flexibility makes another compromise conceivable while explaining the credibility cost.
That government passed a state budget and later collapsed amid defections and policy disputes, including the deadlock over renewing emergency regulations applying Israeli law to Israelis in Judea and Samaria. Its collapse cannot accurately be attributed to Arab participation alone.
The Haredi route has different obstacles. Shas has reaffirmed loyalty to Netanyahu. Yaakov Asher’s office initially reported no opposition approaches apart from a message from Netanyahu’s circle about keeping partners together. Goldknopf left room for discussions subject to rabbinical decisions; Segal later assessed that United Torah Judaism might decline to recommend Netanyahu. No such recommendation should be assumed before it occurs.
Adding the two Haredi parties would bring the non-Arab opposition to 61, but losing Liberman would reduce it to 54. Conscription disagreements remain. No publicly verified group of 13 committed Likud recruits has been established.
Earlier coalition constraints and reported positions · Subsequent negotiations
Ra’am and the Joint List
Ra’am has Islamist roots and participated in the 2021 governing coalition. Abbas has described Israel’s Jewish and democratic character as an existing reality rather than an Arab national aspiration. He has said he condemned Hamas’s October 7 actions while resisting an interviewer’s formulation about destroying Hamas. Yoav Segalovitz explicitly said Hamas is a terrorist organization that must be destroyed.
Those distinctions matter because Eisenkot previously said Ra’am did not meet his conditions for partnership, including his position on Hamas.
The Joint List brings together Hadash, Ta’al and Balad. Its platform opposes the Zionist political consensus, calls for an end to Israeli wars and advances Palestinian national and civic demands. Chairman Yousef Jabareen has offered backing to replace Netanyahu while seeking substantive political partnership. The party demands policy change and an end to Arab citizens’ political exclusion.
Specific historical disputes include Eisenkot’s support for disqualifying Balad leader Sami Abu Shehadeh over statements following October 7. Abu Shehadeh denied supporting the massacre and is not an incoming MK.
Equal voting rights do not settle disagreements over coalition policy. Disagreement with a particular party also does not justify treating all Arab representatives as sharing identical positions.
Abbas and Segalovitz interview · Joint List platform · Joint List’s offer
Netanyahu’s options and the question of trust
Netanyahu’s reported opening position is to preserve his partners, invite others and reject rotation. He reportedly told Ben Gvir and Smotrich:
“We are together and we are staying together,”
Adding Eisenkot would produce 74 without removing partners. Exclusions would become a possible negotiating concession. Removing both Haredi parties would leave 61 but retain Ben Gvir and Religious Zionism–Zehut. Removing both Ben Gvir and Religious Zionism–Zehut would leave 61 but retain the Haredi parties and the conscription dispute.
Likud, Yashar, Together and Yisrael Beiteinu could total 67 without Netanyahu’s four existing partner lists. That would require a major agreement and a substantial break with his promise to preserve them.
Ra’am’s eight could take his existing bloc to 61, but Abbas has indicated opposition to joining a Netanyahu-led government. Smotrich vetoed an arrangement involving Ra’am’s outside support in 2021.
The 2020 Netanyahu–Gantz rotation government collapsed over the budget before Gantz assumed the premiership. Gantz now advocates unity again, saying circumstances have changed. Implementation and enforceability would be central concerns for an incoming partner.
Netanyahu’s election-night position · Calls for unity
Herzog and the new Knesset
Herzog’s consultations begin November 4 after formal receipt of the results. He has urged compromise and avoiding another election, while asserting his own responsibility for choosing whom to task. Trump’s preference can influence negotiations without determining that appointment.
The first candidate receives 28 days, with a possible extension of up to 14 days. Segal expects Eisenkot to receive the first opportunity if he secures more recommendations; no appointment was established in the reviewed reporting. Netanyahu remains caretaker during another candidate’s attempt. The new Knesset is expected to convene November 10.
Tibi has pledged support for replacing the speaker, promised not to support Likud-initiated no-confidence motions and said he would not initiate dissolution legislation. Those commitments could assist parliamentary cooperation without settling the government or budget. No agreed speaker candidate was established in earlier reporting; Liberman has rejected the role.
Segal questions whether speculation about a Haredi partnership represents a viable deal or helps restore Haredi parties’ acceptability, including for a later Likud arrangement. That is his interpretation.
Haim Bibas and Shay Hajaj, Gallant and Gantz have joined calls for unity. Appeals to avoid another election do not establish agreement on its terms. Herzog’s office denied a reported shortened Netanyahu term, retirement and pardon arrangement; no verified joint Trump–Herzog settlement has been announced.
Parliamentary negotiations · Herzog consultations
Election investigations and the status of the results
On November 1, Sohlberg, Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara and Shin Bet chief David Zini said the suspected foreign funding would not invalidate the results even if confirmed:
“The scandal is serious, but the overall election results will not be called into question.”
Segal argues that the statement leaves unanswered whether an individual seat could be affected. He cites roughly 4,000 votes separating Ra’am’s eighth seat from Shas’s seventh. That is a request for clarification, not a determination that those votes were unlawful. He also reported a dispute over the scope of the inquiry, including Zini’s complaint concerning restrictions imposed by the Shin Bet’s legal adviser.
The Shin Bet said its foreign-influence intelligence originated independently of political parties. It described its inquiry as limited and explicitly rejected accusations against an entire population that voted legally.
Separately, Segal reported that information concerning Ra’am activists reached police through Netanyahu’s acting chief of staff and that Lahav 433 officials said there was presently no case. This account should not be merged with the agency’s description of its intelligence inquiry.
i24NEWS alleged cash payments to a Joint List MK, while reporting no evidence that the money reached voters, was used on Election Day or came from Qatar. Qatar denied interference, while Abbas denied Ra’am’s involvement and pledged cooperation.
Likud and its allies have demanded investigations and alleged election theft; Eisenkot has demanded investigation while opposing attempts to delay the Knesset’s swearing-in. These political accusations remain distinct from findings. An investigation order, arrests and detention decisions do not establish guilt or invalidate all Arab-party seats.
Latest investigation reporting · Shin Bet’s explanation
Trump’s public partnership and possible involvement
Trump explicitly connected Netanyahu’s reelection with completing their shared objectives against Iran. Netanyahu responded to the earlier endorsement:
“Thank you, President Trump, for the tremendous support and the joint work. Together we’ll finish the task!”
Trump publicly portrayed Netanyahu as his preferred Israeli partner. That supports an assessment that a Netanyahu-led unity government could preserve the partnership while broadening parliamentary backing.
Trump also said:
“We need to finish the job — either through a deal or another way — we will find out if negotiations can succeed,”
His wording leaves diplomacy and military action available. Preserving the partnership, choosing renewed strikes and timing action to influence coalition talks remain separate decisions. No public evidence reviewed establishes a coordinated military timetable intended to determine the coalition.
Asked about coalition intervention, Trump said:
“I will take a look,”
A U.S. official subsequently called reports of specific preferred coalitions “false and premature.” Reports of American objections to Ben Gvir, possible objections involving Smotrich and a potential later initiative involving Netanyahu and Eisenkot remain reporting or assessments rather than an announced American coalition plan.
Trump could potentially help negotiate policy limits, changes in membership or arrangements for sharing responsibility. Leaders reversing campaign commitments would need substantial terms they could defend to voters.
Netanyahu’s response to Trump · Trump’s diplomatic and military formulation · White House position on coalition intervention
Iran timing and the wider security burden
The Israeli Broadcasting Authority reports completed Israeli offensive and defensive preparations, Gulf consultations, particularly with Abraham Accords signatories, and U.S.-Israeli military coordination. U.S. transport and refueling aircraft have arrived in the region.
Axios reports Netanyahu pressing for strikes immediately after the November 3 U.S. midterms while Trump wants more time for diplomacy. Their shared objectives therefore coexist with a reported timing disagreement. November 4 is not an established attack date.
According to Axios, Hegseth and Rubio are skeptical of an agreement and favor further weakening Iran, while Vance, Witkoff and Kushner favor renewed negotiations. A U.S. official suggested a poor Republican midterm result could make Trump more inclined toward military action; a White House official said the election would not influence his decision. The newly elected Congress takes office in January rather than immediately after election day.
Diplomatic proposals concerning nuclear inspections, sanctions relief and frozen funds remain under discussion. Reports have differed over the characterization and acceptability of proposals. Iran has threatened broader retaliation and a prolonged conflict. A campaign described by U.S. sources as potentially short and intense could develop differently.
Reports of limited U.S. strikes in southern Iran retain their qualifications. The reported Qeshm and Jasak incidents lacked official confirmation.
The security burden extends beyond Iran. The IDF reports continued Hamas rebuilding despite the ceasefire, Reuters has reported Hezbollah rebuilding with Iranian funding, and operations continue in Judea and Samaria. Defense Ministry Director General Amir Baram has emphasized munitions self-sufficiency and preparation for a decade of intense security challenges. A governing agreement would need to address personnel, production and resources as well as immediate operations.
The Home Front Command rescue exercise announced November 1 was described by the IDF as preplanned and unrelated to a new assessment; it should not be presented as independent proof of an impending attack.
Latest Iran preparations and timing · U.S. divisions and Iranian warnings · Defense industry priorities
Emergency cooperation and lasting unity
Ynet’s legal analysis explains that the caretaker government retains security authority. War or military action meeting the statutory threshold requires government approval, or Security Cabinet approval under delegated authority. The prime minister cannot decide alone.
Caretaker governments must balance continuing activity and urgent needs against restraint over major discretionary decisions. Unnecessary irreversible decisions, narrow partisan actions and use of public resources for unfair electoral advantage should be avoided. Senior appointments are not absolutely prohibited but require appropriate legal review.
Ynet distinguishes Guardian of the Walls and Breaking Dawn, limited responses to specific warnings, from initiating a broad war. Eisenkot’s political support conditions do not alter the government’s legal procedures.
Eisenkot previously warned:
“Netanyahu, don’t you dare use Israel’s security for your political needs.”
The political effects of military action deserve scrutiny. No public evidence reviewed establishes an intention by Trump or Netanyahu to initiate a campaign to secure a coalition.
| Security outcome | Possible political effect |
|---|---|
| Diplomacy gains time | Leadership, conscription and coalition disputes remain central |
| A limited campaign begins | Temporary participation or outside support could become easier to justify |
| Fighting becomes prolonged | Demands to share responsibility could grow alongside disputes over strategy, casualties and accountability |
| An unexpected confrontation begins before the midterms | Political timetables in both countries could be disrupted |
Opposition leaders can support necessary operations from outside the cabinet. Eisenkot’s participation in the October 2023 emergency government and departure in June 2024 demonstrate that emergency cooperation can remain temporary.
War powers and caretaker restraint
What would change the assessment
Netanyahu benefits from continuity in office and Trump’s publicly stated preference for their partnership. Eisenkot can pursue parliamentary action and a governing agreement. Bennett’s acceptance of its terms could prove decisive.
Continued negotiations under a caretaker government remain the best-supported near-term assessment. Unity has a straightforward numerical basis if a major opposition partner joins Netanyahu. An opposition minority arrangement is legally possible but politically difficult. Another election remains a serious alternative.
Concrete evidence would include acceptance of governing principles, an agreed speaker, reliable confidence support, a conscription compromise or negotiated changes in coalition membership. A statement of support for a candidate should not be treated as acceptance of all these terms.
The electorate also warrants a careful reading. Likud’s 27 seats and the Arab parties’ 19 represent substantial public choices. Segal has criticized dismissive treatment of traditional and Mizrahi Likud voters and poor understanding of their priorities. He contrasted their consolidation with fragmentation among smaller right-wing parties, including votes for lists below the threshold. Those are his analytical arguments, not proof of a single cause for the result.
Neither the largest party nor all seats outside Netanyahu’s bloc automatically supplies an agreed mandate for a particular government. The parties still need terms that can be implemented and sustained.
