Analysis by David Cozocaru
Netanyahu’s advantage begins with remaining in office
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu enters coalition negotiations with an important advantage: he remains prime minister while his opponents try to agree on a replacement. Gadi Eisenkot could receive the first opportunity to form a government, but Naftali Bennett has yet to accept the compromises that could make it possible.
President Trump’s public commitment to his partnership with Netanyahu adds weight to the prospect of unity under Netanyahu’s leadership, particularly if fighting with Iran resumes.
The election has left several possible governments, with no agreement behind any of them. The latest reported allocation gives Netanyahu’s bloc 53 seats, the non-Arab opposition 48 and the Arab parties 19.
Netanyahu does not have to replace existing partners to reach a majority. Adding Eisenkot’s 21 seats would produce 74. Removing allies would become relevant if an incoming partner demanded it.
The choices would then matter. An Eisenkot–Netanyahu combination could exclude Ben Gvir and retain 67 seats. Excluding Ben Gvir and Religious Zionism–Zehut would leave 61. Excluding the two Haredi, or ultra-Orthodox, parties, Shas and United Torah Judaism, would also leave 61, although Ben Gvir and Religious Zionism–Zehut would remain.
These are possible bargains, rather than announced plans. Netanyahu’s reported position is to preserve his partners, invite others and reject rotation.
An agreement would also need credibility. The 2020 rotation government with Gantz collapsed over the budget before Gantz became prime minister. Any new partner would want clear terms and a credible way to ensure they were honored.
Eisenkot needs agreement on how to govern
Eisenkot has offered four foundations for partnership: Israel’s Jewish, democratic, liberal and egalitarian character; the Declaration of Independence; mandatory military, national or civilian service for every citizen; and recognition of Hamas as a terrorist organization whose military and governing power must be destroyed.
His October 31 statement invited any Knesset member accepting those principles. Channel 12 commentator Amit Segal noted that it omitted a categorical rejection of Netanyahu. The significance remains unresolved, particularly given Eisenkot’s earlier explicit refusal to serve under him, including through rotation.
The opposition has difficulties of its own. Yair Golan advocates Jewish-Arab partnership, but several prospective partners reject the cooperation needed. Ra’am’s eight seats would take the opposition to 56; adding the Joint List’s 11 would produce 67.
Ra’am and the Joint List offer different partnerships. Their positions on Israel’s identity, service obligations and security policy require separate assessment. Joint List number four Bakr Awawda has demanded that Eisenkot abandon his four principles. His statement exposes a substantive disagreement, although it does not establish every Joint List representative’s final position.
A minority government could avoid full coalition membership for outside supporters. Its governing parties would hold fewer than 61 seats, but it could take office with more votes in favor than against.
Opposition–Ra’am support of 56 could defeat Netanyahu’s 53 if the Joint List abstained. Netanyahu’s 53 could likewise defeat the non-Arab opposition’s 48 if both Arab parties abstained. Either arrangement would require continuing cooperation to govern.
Recruiting Haredi parties creates another conflict. Shas and United Torah Judaism would take the opposition to 61, but losing Avigdor Liberman’s seven would reduce that combination to 54. Conscription remains a fundamental policy obstacle.
Bennett’s recommendation leaves the governing terms open
Bennett’s recommendation of Eisenkot helps establish who should try to form a government. It leaves open which governing arrangement Bennett would accept.
According to Segal’s analysis, Bennett and Yair Lapid’s joint list, Together, has 12 seats comprising seven Bennett representatives and five Lapid representatives. All 12 joining Netanyahu would produce 65. Bennett’s seven alone would produce 60. That division describes political affiliations, rather than an announced split or votes promised to Netanyahu.
Segal’s argument that Bennett is pivotal concerns political cooperation rather than arithmetic: Netanyahu and Eisenkot already have 74 without him. Segal assesses that Eisenkot would not want to enter a Netanyahu government without Bennett and could not carry an arrangement involving Haredi and/or Arab parties without his cooperation.
Their possible rewards differ. Eisenkot could become prime minister in a minority arrangement. Bennett could reverse commitments while receiving a senior ministry rather than returning to the premiership. Segal therefore argues that another election might offer Bennett a better opportunity. That remains an assessment, rather than Bennett’s declared intention.
The 2021 precedent explains the credibility problem. Bennett reversed commitments concerning Lapid and reliance on Mansour Abbas’s votes. Another reversal would carry a cost. Lapid, meanwhile, faces his own objections to serving under Netanyahu; Together’s seats cannot simply be assigned to Bennett.
Trump’s partnership with Netanyahu could increase pressure for unity
Trump explicitly connected Netanyahu’s reelection with their shared objectives against Iran:
“Vote for Bibi Netanyahu for Prime Minister, we have to finish the job that we started!”
Netanyahu has reciprocated that commitment. Trump’s preference for continuing their partnership is clear. A Netanyahu-led unity government could preserve it while giving Israel’s government broader parliamentary support.
A renewed campaign could increase pressure on Eisenkot and Bennett to share responsibility. Emergency participation might become easier to defend to voters than an open-ended coalition reversal.
However, no public evidence reviewed establishes a coordinated military timetable intended to determine Israel’s next government. Their shared objective also leaves room for disagreement over methods: Trump has publicly left both a deal and military action available.
The latest Axios reporting describes Netanyahu pressing for strikes immediately after the November 3 U.S. midterms, while Trump favors more time for diplomacy.
Israel has reportedly completed offensive and defensive preparations, and U.S. aircraft have arrived in the region. Extensive preparations make renewed fighting a serious possibility; they do not establish an attack date.
Herzog’s consultations begin November 4. They start the government-formation process rather than end Netanyahu’s caretaker tenure. Military action later in the negotiations could also affect political choices.
Nor would war guarantee unity. Opposition leaders could support necessary operations from outside the cabinet. Eisenkot has limited his promised support to direct, immediate threats that cannot wait. His participation in the 2023 emergency government, followed by his departure in June 2024, demonstrates that emergency cooperation can remain temporary.
A short campaign could encourage cooperation. Prolonged fighting could deepen disagreements over objectives, casualties and accountability.
The caretaker government retains security powers, but decisions concerning war require collective approval under the applicable legal procedures. Netanyahu cannot decide alone.
The next meaningful steps are political commitments
Herzog will decide whom to give the first mandate. The initial attempt provides 28 days, with a possible extension of up to 14 days. Receiving that opportunity would give Eisenkot time to negotiate, rather than an automatic transfer of power.
The opposition could first cooperate in parliament. Ahmad Tibi has pledged support for replacing the speaker and promised not to support Likud-initiated no-confidence motions or initiate dissolution legislation.
Eisenkot wants a state commission of inquiry, service reform and other legislation. Each would require supporting votes; parliamentary cooperation would not itself establish a governing coalition.
The election investigations must also retain their proper scope. Central Elections Committee chairman Noam Sohlberg, the attorney general and the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) chief have said the overall results will stand even if the foreign-funding suspicions are confirmed.
Segal has questioned whether an individual seat could be affected. That question is not a finding of unlawful votes, and the investigations do not justify treating all Arab-party seats as disqualified.
Trump and Herzog could help leaders negotiate concessions, but no verified joint coalition framework has been announced. Netanyahu’s existing partners, Eisenkot’s conditions, Bennett’s political risks and Lapid’s position still require answers.
Continued negotiations under a caretaker government remain the best-supported near-term assessment. Unity has a straightforward numerical basis if a major opposition partner joins Netanyahu. An opposition minority government is legally possible but politically difficult. Another election remains a serious alternative.
The evidence that would change this assessment is concrete: acceptance of governing principles, reliable confidence support, a conscription compromise or negotiated changes in coalition membership.
Trump’s partnership with Netanyahu could strengthen the pressure to reach such an agreement. The decisive terms still have to be accepted by Israeli leaders and defended to their voters.
Go deeper: the coalition analysis companion
For readers who want the full background, this optional companion brings together the seat totals and coalition calculations, political history, election-investigation details and sources behind this analysis.
