Amit Segal argues that the emerging count has changed the exit poll picture: Netanyahu has not yet won, but, in Segal’s assessment, the Change Bloc has been defeated. While the exit polls appeared to show Netanyahu losing without a clear winner opposite him, Segal writes that the actual results have strengthened his position.
Segal describes the Change Bloc’s campaign as the most meticulously organized he has seen since beginning political coverage at the start of the century. He cites vote-sharing agreements and an unprecedented effort to fly Israelis home to vote.
Yet, according to the count he cites, the bloc secured roughly the same number of seats as in the previous election. He argues that demographics outweighed campaign energy and that its messaging failed to persuade.
In his assessment, voters accepted neither the claim that the war was a complete victory nor that it was a complete failure. Although repelled by ultra-Orthodox draft evasion, they did not accept a minority government dependent on parties he characterizes as draft refusers and anti-Zionists.
He contrasts public disgust at chants of “We Do Not Believe in the Rule of the Zionists” with shock at the singing of “Biladi, Biladi” at Joint List headquarters.
Segal writes that the exit polls initially appeared to make the Knesset speaker’s removal and an Eisenkot-led minority government virtually certain. He argues that the emerging results mean Eisenkot no longer meets his own stated criteria for forming such a government, which would require the Joint List’s active support.
Segal considers that arrangement unworkable after October 7, citing the prospect of six immediate relatives of people murdered by Hamas sitting alongside lawmakers whom he accuses of portraying Hamas as a charitable organization.
Invoking a remark attributed to Moshe Dayan, Segal portrays Netanyahu’s improved bargaining position as an implicit message to the Change Bloc: “Here is my phone number. You are welcome to call.” This is Segal’s analogy, not a reported Netanyahu quotation.
Lieberman, Bennett and Eisenkot now face three difficult options, he argues: another election without the thousands of Israelis abroad who rushed home to vote; joining Netanyahu’s bloc on difficult terms and breaking campaign promises; or seeking support from Ra’am and the Joint List, which he describes as emboldened by victory.
Segal concludes that the “unity bloc” sought during the campaign failed to emerge through Gantz, Erdan, Winter, Zelekha, Tropper or others. Instead, he suggests, Arab parties may have become its unexpected catalyst.
He describes Arab turnout as extraordinary and historic, adding that its levels require thorough examination. By preventing either side from reaching 61 seats, he argues, that turnout may ultimately push Jewish political rivals to sit together after years of division.
